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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
SUZANNE NEBEKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 9917-89 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(d) if the matters appealed from are 
interlocutory in nature or (e) if the matters appealed from are a final 
judgment or order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellant appeals from an order in which the trial court denied a motion 
to dismiss an Amended Information which was filed after the trial court 
declared a mistrial because the defendant had claimed that they were surprised 
by the prosecutor's election to include two incidents of claimed child abuse 
in the same information. The issues raised are: 
1. Whether the bringing of the second information after a 
mistrial is barred on double jeopardy grounds; 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the 
amended information due to the prosecutor's notification to defendant that 
there existed a video tape and that the defendant could make arrangements to 
view or copy the video tape; and 
3. Whether the prosecutor filing of an amended information after 
a mistrial and gaining an additional count and embodying two incidents as had 
previously been embodied in one count as two separate counts constitutes 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In this case there are questions of law. Questions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Layva, 951 P.2d 738, 739-743 (Utah 1997). An issue 
which is part of and important to the double jeopardy issue is whether or not 
the defendant acquiesced in, agreed to or in some way helped initiate the 
mistrial, thereby waiving the defense of a bar on double jeopardy grounds. 
This is a question of fact which the court reviews for an abuse of discretion. 
Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Hill v. Hill, 841 
P.2d 721, 724 (Utah App. 1992)). The trial court's decision on a question of 
fact is entitled to a presumption of validity (Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 
124 (Utah App.' 1987) ) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Where the trial court declared a mistrial with the knowledge, 
consent and on the insistence of the defendant, is the prosecution of the same 
offense on an amended information precluded on double jeopardy grounds? 
B. Does the prosecutor's notification to the defendant that 
there existed a video tape interview of the victim and the indication that the 
defendant could obtain a copy of the tape by making arrangements for the 
appropriate costs violate the Utah State Constitution or constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct for failure to provide discovery? 
C. Does the prosecutor's filing of a two-count information for child 
abuse based upon two incidents approximately eight days apart constitute 
prosecutorial vindictiveness, where the original one-count information 
embodying both incidents as one abuse did not result in a verdict where a 
mistrial was declared? 
D. Has the Defendant preserved a due process claim where she only 
stated in her Motion to Dismiss on "constitutional grounds'' . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson declared a mistrial in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court on December 17, 1999, when the defendant, through her counsel, 
indicated that she was surprised by the way the prosecution was intending to 
proceed, in that the prosecutor had elected to consolidate two incidents, one 
occurring on November 28, 1998 and the second occurring on December 6, 1998, 
into one count of child abuse. 
Defendant claimed surprise and an inability to defend. The defendant 
requested a mistrial and the Court declared such mistrial. 
The State then refiled the action alleging two counts of physical abuse 
of a child; a separate count for each incident - one occurring on November 28, 
1998 and the other on December 6, 1998. 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended information based 
upon "constitutional grounds", double jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness 
and failure to provide adequate discovery". 
This is an appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court's denial of a 
Motion to Dismiss. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 17, 1999, Suzanne Nebeker was brought to trial on the charge 
of child abuse. The prosecutor notified the court that the one count covered 
two incidents, beginning on November 28, 1998 and continuing until December 6, 
1998. The charging document indicated that the abuse occurred on or about the 
28th day of November, 1998. 
Counsel for defendant indicated he had been prepared to proceed on an 
incident occurring on November 28, a Sunday, just before the victim moved out 
of the home. This understanding actually combines both events. November 28, 
1998, was the Saturday following Thanksgiving, and "Sunday" (December 6) is 
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the concluding date, to which the prosecutor referred as being a continuation 
of the same event or events. The defense asserted that they had been 
surprised by this action, had not had an opportunity to prepare and requested 
that the Court grant the defendant a mistrial. 
Following a noon recess and a detailed questioning of Defendant and her 
counsel as to their desire for a mistrial, the Court granted a mistrial. The 
prosecutor later filed a two-count amended information separating the two 
incidents. Defendant claimed filing of the amended information was double 
jeopardy. Defendant claimed at trial that the prosecution failed to provide 
transcripts of video taped interviews and this was a reason that the 
defendant was .compelled to request a mistrial. Finally, the defendant claims 
that because the prosecutor filed the incidents as one count in the original 
information, and now had separated the incidents into two counts, that this 
action constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness. 
It is from the Court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss on the foregoing 
grounds that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter proceeded on a one-count information for child abuse 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-5-109(3)(a) alleging that the defendant 
had intentionally or knowingly inflicted injury upon a child on or about 
November 28, 1998 (Court File Page 1 (CF 1)). Although the Defendant 
initially represented herself and filed some pleadings (Per se pleadings were 
prepared by Defendant's counsel) (Transcript 147-148), she was represented by 
counsel at the trial of the matter on December 17, 1999. (Notice of 
Appearance, CF 28) 
A jury was empaneled and seated, but prior to opening arguments, the 
Prosecutor requested a side bar with the Judge. A partial transcript of that 
side bar was transcribed by Defendant's counsel and appears to be an accurate 
representation of what occurred. (CF 81) During the side bar the Prosecutor 
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stated that the original information memorialized an occurrence beginning on 
or about the 28th day of November, and continued until the 6th day of December, 
when the victim moved out of the home. It was the intent of the Prosecutor to 
treat the incidents of child abuse over that period of time as one incident 
and to only charge it as one count. Defense counsel expressed surprise and 
indicated to the court that he was not prepared to proceed. 
The Prosecutor gave opening argument and at the closing of his opening 
argument objection was made by defense counsel which concerned the subject of 
the earlier side bar. Defense counsel also expressed his understanding of the 
nature of the case he was defending (Transcript p.36). Counsel had received 
an incident report from San Juan County Sheriff's Deputy Kelly Bradford, which 
indicated that the victim had been hit and kicked by her stepmother 
(defendant) on the Saturday following Thanksgiving. (See Exhibit D to 
Prosecutor's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, CF 
196). The date of November 28 corresponds to the Saturday following 
Thanksgiving in 1998. Defense Counsel also received the Child Protective 
Services Report (CPS Report of Chris Veach) (Tr. 92-121, 157-182) The first 
entries on page 1 dated December 4, 1998, indicated that an incident had 
occurred on Saturday night, that her mother and her had had an argument, and 
that they saw marks on her (CF 92). The Report further indicated an interview 
which occurred on the 8th day of December, 1998, which stated that on Sunday 
night the Defendant had thrown a phone at her, had broken a window and that 
the victim had left the residence. (CF 94-95) 
The reports which were in the possession of the Defendant set forth two 
separate dates. The knowledge of Defense Counsel as to these two incidents 
can be gleaned from the following statements: 
Mr. Collins:uThe report given to me, Your Honor, indicate an 
interview on December 8, 1999[sic], with Lindsay Watson, in which 
she claims that abuse occurred on the 28th of November, which was a 
Sunday evening and that on the following day, Monday, she was - -
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- ran away from home and did not return after that to the home." 
(Transcript 36-37) 
• • * 
The Court:"And I think I'm now getting a picture on this issue 
over whether we are trying what happened on the 28th or what 
happened on the 6th or what happened together. And I am getting a 
picture that in your mind these things got blurred because you 
told me when we started here that something happened on Sunday and 
the next day she went to school and left. That's the 6th of 
December. So apparently you came here prepared to address what 
happened on that Sunday" 
Mr. Collins: I understood that was the 28th, but apparently that's 
not the 28th." (Transcript 116) 
• * * 
The Court:" . . . you said, Mr. Collins, that you're not prepared 
to defend the 6th, but in fact it now appears that most of what you 
knew about this is actually conduct on the 6th, which you thought 
was on the 28th, but if you still object to him trying both counts 
as one . . . (Transcript p.118) 
• * * 
Mr. Collins:"During the interview, Ms. Nebeker or Ms. Watson, 
talking about the witness who testified stated that she had been 
hit and kicked by her stepmother who is Ms. Suzanne Nebeker. This 
happened the Saturday after Thanksgiving, 1998. Ms. Watson left 
the home and was placed in shelter care. Ms. Watson is currently 
in foster care situation and there is a restraining order in place 
against Ms. Nebeker. 
And then it goes on about some other things that occurred in 1999. 
As a result, Your Honor, it was our understanding from discovery 
and the case we prepared for, that what we were dealing here was 
with the events of the 28th of November. 
The Court: I need to ask you something, Mr. Collins. You told me 
during the side bar conference that you were expecting to try a 
case about something that happened on a Sunday and that the child 
left the house the next day after going to school. 
Mr. Collins: Correct, Your Honor. 
The Court: That matches the 6th and 7th of December. 
Mr. Collins: That's correct. It does now. At the time I told the 
Court that my understanding was the 28th was a Sunday and that she 
had left on a Monday, that's why I told the Court now that, that's 
how I understood it, that's how I, in fact, made my opening 
statement to the jury because based on these records, that's what 
it said. 
Now I understand, Your Honor, that we have two counts that we are 
talking about. 
The Court: That we have two instances. 
Mr. Collins: Two instances that we are talking about. Totally 
different incidences and frankly I was very surprised to learn 
that, and the Court is correct, that now it appears that the 28th 
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is a Saturday, something I learned as we went through the trial 
and that the 6th is a Sunday, which is approximately a week later. 
Something I was not prepared for. Counsel has argued those 
incidences to the jury." (Transcript p.145-146) 
• • * 
Mr. Collins: " . . . I have a massive amount of information about 
this case . . . I can honestly tell the Court that as I came here 
today, and I reread all the discovery that I received from the 
court before coming today. In fact, I reread it this morning. Got 
up early. That I honestly understood that we were dealing with an 
incident that occurred on what I believed to be the 28th of 
November, a Sunday, and on the next day this child went to school, 
did not come home, and that the incident then moved forward from 
there to the CPS custody." (Transcript p.150) 
• * • 
Mr. Collins: "That's why when counsel stood up I was very 
surprised this morning. This did not seem like a difficult case 
to me with events that occurred on the 28th. 
The Court: So what you're expecting to hear is what you heard 
about. What you were expecting to hear was evidence about, well, 
the conduct you were expecting to hear about was conduct occurring 
on a Sunday, followed by a child's departure from the home. And 
you have actually heard about that. 
Mr. Collins: The following day. 
The Court: But the date was not the 6th of December. 
Mr. Collins: It's not quite that simple because we now have an 
intervening week that I have to deal about that I didn't know 
about. That's what I'm telling the Court. I, yes, I knew about 
the alleged conduct of the 6th. (Transcript p. 151) . 
Mr. Collins was invited by the Court to take the noon recess and 
determine whether he would ask for a mistrial. Upon returning from the 
recess, Mr. Collins requested that the Court declare a mistrial. The Court's 
reasoning and direct examination of the Defendant occurs in the Transcript at 
pages 159-161: 
Ms. Nebeker: Your Honor, I have spoken with my attorney. He has 
given me all of the options and I think I have a fairly good 
understanding of, urn, the facts here and, urn, I feel like it, it 
would be at this point in my best interest to, to consider this 
option. 
The Court: You're not just considering that your asking for it 
now. 
Ms. Nebeker: I'm asking for it, you're correct, I am. 
The Court: You could go away tonight completely exonerated and 
free of any further shadow and by doing by you're doing, you're 
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prolonging this. It may, you think, after your, and I don't want 
to pry into your conversation with your attorney, but you are 
comfortable with this decision? 
Ms. Nebeker: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Okay. Well, that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to 
declare a mistrial and schedule a new trial. Mr. Halls, I'll give 
you a chance if you want, to file an Amended Information, to do 
so. Bring the jury in and I'll tell them the good news." 
(Transcript p. 159-161) 
An Amended Information was filed separating the two incidents, alleging 
one count of child abuse occurring on November 28, 1998, and another instance 
occurring on December 6, 1998. The Amended Information was filed on January 
14, 2000. (CF 53). 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Information, stating 
in the Motion "upon constitutional grounds" (CF 54) and in the Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion to Dismiss on the "ground of double jeopardy, 
prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate discovery." (CF 
64) 
The Court heard oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss on February 3, 
2000. 
The Court made Findings of Fact (CF 227-231). The Court found that the 
mistrial was requested by defense counsel (Finding 1, 2 and 3; CF 227-228). 
The Court found that there was no bad faith on the part of the prosecutor's 
filing a single criminal episode on two incidents approximately a week 
apart.(Finding 4; CF 228). 
The Court found that the prosecutor had complied in all respects with 
discovery and that there was no violation of discovery and no bad faith on the 
part of the prosecutor with regard to discovery (Finding 5; CF 228-229), 
The Court found that requiring the Defendant to pay her own costs for 
the copying of a video tape did not constitute "compelling" advancement of 
money in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. (Finding 
6; CF 229) 
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The Court found that there was no vindictiveness on the part of the 
Prosecutor in bringing the second charge and that the Prosecutor, by virtue of 
evidence brought forth at the time of trial may have very well brought a 
tampering with evidence charge, but did not do so. (Findings 7 and 8; CF 229) 
The Court found that the Prosecutor was willing to continue with the 
trial and that he did not evidence a motive to provoke a mistrial in order to 
obtain a more favorable hearing. (Findings 9, 10 and 11; CF 229) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HER DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS 
The procedural context of this appeal is that the Defendant has objected 
to the filing of an Amended Information after a mistrial was declared at the 
Defendant's request. Procedural and evidentiary matters which were part of 
the trial are only appropriately questioned by the Defendant as it affects the 
Court's ruling on whether charges could be refiled. Yet, the Defendants 
spends a number of pages in her brief discussing due process, and, 
particularly at page 21, that failure to provide certain discovery violates 
due process, with the emphasis in her argument that the Court's prospective 
allowance of the testimony of two CPS workers constitutes a violation of due 
process even though these people did not testify. The Defendant has quoted a 
number of cases saying that in certain states persons working as social 
workers may be determined to be agents of the state and that Miranda would 
have to be given. This argument was not raised in Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss or her Memorandum in support therefore. The question of whether a 
judge properly ruled upon an evidentiary objection, based on Miranda, is moot 
because the people did not testified and is moot when a mistrial is declared 
on other grounds. 
It is not sufficient for a party to simply move to dismiss an 
information based on "'constitutional grounds". (CF 54) The Motion refers to 
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the Memorandum and states that uand for other reasons set forth in Defendant's 
Memorandum". The Memorandum simply claims that the reason for the appeal is 
"double jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate 
discovery" (CF 64). Double jeopardy has its own constitutional basis (Article 
I, Section 12). Objection on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness and 
failure to provide adequate discovery do not signal an intention to preserve 
an issue on due process grounds. A party must make a specific objection or 
run the risk of losing the ability to bring it on appeal. In Jones v. Cyprus 
Plateau Mining Corporation, 944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997), a party objected to 
a jury instruction by simply stating that it misstates the law. The Court 
stated: 
"Because Cyprus's objection to Instruction 41 was not adequately 
preserved for appeal due to the lack of specificity in its initial 
objection, we need not rule on whether the instruction was 
correct. Under Utah law, objections must be raised with 
sufficient specificity at trial for the trial judge to have a 
legal basis for altering or rejecting the instruction/7 
Similarly, in State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), 
a criminal case in which the defendant was being tried for sexual abuse of a 
child, the defendant had some objection to a prosecutor's questioning and to 
statements made in a closing argument, but simply objected on relevance 
grounds, did not renew the objection in the prosecutor's closing, and did not 
ask for a curative instruction, the Court stated: 
"A contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation 
of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal. 
Importantly, the grounds for objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated. Quoting State v. Johnson, 1A P.2d 1141, 1144 
(Utah 1999); quoting State v. Tillman, 570 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987) . 
In State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App 1996), a sexual abuse 
case, the question arose as to whether the prosecutor had breached a plea 
agreement by failing to stand moot at sentencing. 
"It is a well established rule that a defendant who fails to bring 
an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising 
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it for the first time on appeal. Quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In State v. Burns, 98 Utah Advance Report 32, 2000 WL 868493, 1, 3 (Utah 
June 2000), a case in which a person convicted of murder was appealing the 
State's denial of expert assistance unless a legal services counsel was 
representing the person, the Court stated: 
"It is true that an appellate court generally will not review any 
issue that was not raised in the court below. . . Accordingly in 
Cunningham we declined to address a statute of fraud's issue 
because the plaintiff had not raised it before the trial court. 
It was first raised in a post-trial memorandum. See Cunningham, 
690 P.2d at 552, Note 2. Furthermore, in Giles we declined to 
reach the issue of attorney's fees because the issue was not 
raised until appeal. See Giles 657 P.2d at 289." 
Defendant did not raise any due process claims in her motion or 
memorandum. Defendant's memorandum states that they are basing their grounds 
for requesting the Court to dismiss the Amended Information on double 
jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate 
discovery. The Motion simply states "upon constitutional grounds". This is 
not specific enough to preserve the issue of due process as it has not been 
set forth in the Defendant's pleading or argument. While the cases cited 
deal mainly with issues raised during trial, the same applies to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. The issue of due process needed to be raised in specific 
terms in order to be preserved. 
II 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT BAR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS 
DEFENDANT IN A SECOND INFORMATION. 
The Utah Constitution at Article I, Section 12, states "nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense". Utah Code Annotated 
§76-1-403 states in pertinent part: 
"(4). . . however termination of the prosecution is not improper 
if: a)the defendant consents to the termination; or b) the 
defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or c) the 
court finds, and states for the record, that the termination is 
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necessary because (i) it is physically impossibly to proceed with 
the trial and conform with the law; or (ii) there is a legal 
defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or (iii) prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not 
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the 
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state . . . " 
Numerous Utah cases have addressed the issue of double jeopardy as it 
applies to the Utah and Federal constitutions. Many of those cases, in recent 
years, have quoted State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979). The underlying 
proposition is that a defendant is entitled to have a verdict rendered by a 
particular tribunal unless there is some manifest necessity for having that 
right removed. In Ambrose the Utah Supreme Court said that the discharge of a 
jury without a verdict operates as an acquittal unless (1) the defendant 
consents to the discharge or (2) legal necessity requires the discharge in the 
interest of justice. Id. at 358. This philosophy was taken from the case of 
United States v. Journ, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970) where the court explained: 
"If that right to go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is 
because, independent of the threat of bad faith conduct by judge 
or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the 
decision whether or not to take the case from the jury when 
circumstances occur which might be thought to warrant a 
declaration of mistrial. Thus, where circumstances develop not 
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion 
by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any 
barrier to reprosecution even if the defendant's motion is 
necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error." 
The court will find in each of these cases that in order to bar a 
retrial there must be bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor. This 
legal rational has also been followed through the federal system and is stated 
in a case of United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-608(1976), where it 
states: 
"The state may usually retry an accused if he procures the 
declaration of a mistrial; however, the double jeopardy clause 
bars retrial where bad faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor is 
intended to provoke a mistrial request, and thereby allow the 
state an additional opportunity to convict the defendant/' 
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The authorities generally hold that if a defendant asks for a mistrial 
he waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy 
even though the prosecution provoked the error. State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 
657 (Utah 1982) quoting State v. Ambrose.) Thus, the holding in Jones stated: 
"Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to 
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching a motion by the defendant 
for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier of 
reprosecution even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by 
prosecutorial or judicial error." 
In our case the Defendant sought the mistrial based upon her allegation 
of surprise in the charging document. Defense Counsel did not know that the 
Saturday following Thanksgiving (November 28), and Sunday night before the 
victim left the home (December 6), were two different incidents, even though 
the reports distinctly separate them and Counsel had reviewed both, but 
thought they were the same day. (Transcript 36-37, 116, 118, 145-146, 150-
151) 
The Court, aware of the holding in Ambrose went to great lengths to 
determine if the Defendant understood the import of her request for a 
mistrial. (Findings CF 227) Ultimately, the Defendant sought and received a 
mistrial (Transcript 159-161). There was no indication of bad faith or that 
the prosecutor had withheld discovery or sought a mistrial to obtain a better 
result. (Findings CF 227; CF 184) There was no indication of prosecutorial or 
judicial error. 
The State does not dispute that jeopardy had attached to the charge of 
child abuse alleged to have occurred on or about the 28th day of November, 
1998, because the jury had been empaneled, the first witness had been sworn 
and the Court began to take evidence. However, it does not necessarily follow 
that since a mistrial has been declared that the retrial on the same charge is 
barred. In State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065-1066 (Utah 1983) the court 
stated: 
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"It is not however necessarily true that a retrial is barred by 
the double jeopardy clause in all cases once jeopardy has attached 
. . . When a defendant's motion for a mistrial is granted, the 
jury is unable to reach a verdict or a conviction is reversed on 
appeal for errors of law in the trial of the case, a defendant may 
be retried not withstanding the double jeopardy clause. Quoting 
E.g., Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977); State v. 
Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State v. Gardner, 
62 Utah 62, 217 P.2d 976 (1923); see United States v. Scott, 437 
U.S. 82 (1978) (Scott held that where a defendant "seeks to 
terminate the trial before a verdict on grounds unrelated to 
factual guilt or innocence" i.d. at 87 the double jeopardy clause 
does not bar retrial.)(Emphasis added) 
In the case of State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990) the 
defendant seeking a dismissal on double jeopardy grounds tried to established 
the prosecutor had shown bad faith by not providing portions of lab reports in 
a rape case. In Trafny the court stated: 
"If a defendant seeks a mistrial he waives any defense he might 
otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy even though the 
prosecution or the court provoked the error unless it can be shown 
that the bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor is intended 
to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more 
favorable opportunity to convict/7 Id. at 709. 
The court, in Trafny, failed to grant the request of the defendant for a 
dismissal on double jeopardy grounds because the court stated: 
"In the instant case there is no indication that the prosecution 
intentionally or in bad faith withheld any of the lab reports in 
order to cause a mistrial, thereby improving the chances of 
conviction in a new trial." 
The court required the record reflect bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence in order to 
provoke a mistrial to gain some tactical advantage in order for a dismissal on 
double jeopardy grounds to be allowed. 
It appears from the case law that the Defendant, to succeed with her 
double jeopardy argument, must show three things: 1) that there was "bad 
faith" by the judge or prosecutor and motive to provoke a more favorable trial 
in order to 2) afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict. 
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1982), and 3) if a defendant seeks a 
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mistrial he generally waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon 
double jeopardy, even though the prosecution or the court provoked the error. 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) quoting State v. Trafny, 799 
P.2 704, 709 (Utah 1990). As was the case in Rudolph, the defense in this 
case must demonstrate that the prosecutor provoked the mistrial and further 
that the prosecution did so intentionally so as to provide a more favorable 
opportunity to convict. 
The Court found no bad faith on the part of the Prosecutor or the 
defendant (Transcript of Proceeding on Motion to Dismiss (Tr. MTD) p.21, et 
seq.): 
A.- In making the charges (Tr. MTD p. 21) 
B. In providing discovery (Tr. MTD p.21) 
C. In not determining earlier that the incidents occurred over 8 
days (Tr. MTD p.23) 
The prosecutor made every effort to complete the trial and to proceed 
with the jury upon the charging document before the court. The Prosecutor 
asked the Court to make a finding on the motive of the Prosecutor to provoke a 
mistrial. The Court said (Tr. MTD p.24): 
UI just don't think there's any basis in the record for that. It 
was clear to me that the prosecutor very definitely did not want a 
mistrial and was very much inclined to go forward. . . But what I 
believe is that the prosecutor just didn't want to have to do this 
twice. It's miserable enough doing it once. He was willing to 
take his chances of losing the case the first time around. That's 
what I was seeing in the courtroom. I was seeing a prosecutor 
that wanted to go forward - very much wanted to go forward, even 
though he might - he might have some advantages from coming back 
with a second trial with two counts." 
The Court very specifically, "very pointedly", (Tr. MTD p.20) asked 
Defense counsel and Defendant if this was their desire to move for a mistrial 
after admonishing them that it may not be in the Defendant's interest 
(Transcript 159-161). The Defendant has failed to establish bad faith, a 
motivation on the part of the prosecutor to retry the case or that a retrial 
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would provide a more favorable opportunity to convict. The Defendant 
requested the mistrial with full knowledge of the consequences and has, 
according to Utah law, waived her right to contest a retrial on double 
jeopardy grounds. 
Ill 
DISCOVERY 
A. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY 
IS UNTIMELY. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
"Any defense, objection or request, including requests for ruling 
on admissibility of evidence which is capable of determination 
without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to 
trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least 
five days prior to the trial: 
. . . (3) Requests for Discovery where allowed;" 
The statement that the Prosecutor failed to comply in providing any 
materials relating to video tapes or transcripts is untimely. The Defendant 
was notified that video tapes existed. It is stated in both the report of 
Officer Kelly Bradford (Transcript 186) and in the Answer to Request for 
Discovery (Transcript 187) that video or audio tapes exist. This was provided 
in advance of the trial of the matter, within three days of the request. If 
the Defendant had concern that some materials (transcripts) were not provided 
she had an obligation pursuant to Rule 12 to raise the issue with the Court at 
least five days prior to the trial. 
B. THE PROSECUTION PROVIDED ALL DISCOVERY MATERIAL; THERE 
WAS NO DISCOVERY VIOLATION. 
The Defendant, mostly through innuendo, asserts that the State failed to 
provide discoverable information. This point is refuted by the Court in the 
Findings (Transcript 228, Findings paragraph 5) where the Court found that 
there was no bad faith on the part of the Prosecutor with regard to discovery 
and that there was no violation of discovery. Going to the Court record, it 
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is made clear that the material the Defendant continually stated was withheld 
by the Prosecution never existed. No case law or statute has required law 
enforcement officers to transcribe taped statements. If those materials 
(transcripts) do not exist, the State is not required to manufacture them. 
It was clear from the Court's findings on motions presented at the trial 
that the State asserted on several occasions that a transcript did not exist, 
yet the Defendant continues to raise a question with regard to the 
Prosecutor's integrity by inferring that the reports exist, but that the 
Prosecutor claimed there were no reports. (Defendant's brief p.21) 
This should not be a confusing issue for the Defendant. It was 
explained clearly on several occasions that those persons whom the State 
intended to have testify, being Mr. Webb and Mr. Hatch, did not prepare 
independent reports; their notes and observations were included in the report 
of Chris Veach: 
"Mr. Collins: The other problem I have, Your Honor, is that I have 
gotten no reports from these people that have supposedly done the 
interviews. I have a report, once again, Chris, that summarizes 
what supposedly happened. But I have nothing from those gentlemen 
who are going to testify. If there are such reports I ask that 
they be reproduced so I can review them before they testify. 
The Court: Well? 
Mr. Halls: Your Honor, there are no such reports. I think in 
talking with Robert Hatch he made some notes and I don't, I don't 
have those notes and I don't think Mr. Collins is entitled to 
those notes. So what I have is, basically his notes were included 
in Ms. , in Chris Veach's reports, which he has gotten." 
The issue was again raised in the Motion hearing on February 23, 2000, 
where the State indicated to the Court that no transcript existed. Yet the 
Defendant continues to allege or infer that because they didn't have a 
transcript of that interview that the State was somehow withholding it. The 
Prosecutor stated that Mr. Webb and Mr. Hatch reported to Chris Veach and 
their findings were included in her report. The Prosecutor stated: 
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"They made no reports; there is no report; there still is no 
report. 
The Court: Transcript or report, Mr. Halls? 
Mr. Halls: There is a report in Chris Veach's statement. There is 
no transcript. They didn't make, they didn't make a separate 
report. They reported to the case worker, Chris Veach, and it is 
in her document that they received." (Tr. MTD p.6) 
Collins again questions the integrity of the Prosecutor in his 
where he states: 
"The Court asked counsel whether or not there was no report or 
whether or not there is no transcript. That question never got 
answered; which is a question I would like to know about. In 
other words we are told they videotaped the victim, the alleged 
victim in this case, but were not told whether or not there is a 
transcript of that. 
We're told that apparently, and I don't know this to be a fact, 
but is seems like apparently the interview with the defendant was 
also taped, but we're told that we don't know that there was a 
transcript of that. Just that these folks were going to get up 
and testify to something she said, having made no notes, having 
made no reports, having made no reporting, apparently, but never 
having a transcription of it. So that seems interesting that we 
don't . . . 
The Court: I thought I got an answer, Mr. Collins. 
Mr. Collins: I'm sorry. 
The Court: I thought I did get an answer. 
Mr. Collins: What? Is there a transcript or isn't there? I 
didn't understand. 
The Court: No, he didn't give you a reading. Is there a 
transcript? 
Mr. Halls: Well, then, Mr. Collins, here today -
The Court: Hang on, do you want to know if there is a transcript -
of what? 
Mr. Collins: Of either the video tape or the interview, taped 
interviews. 
The Court: Is there a transcript of either the video tape or the 
taped interviews? 
Mr. Halls: See, here is another mischaracterization. I did not 
say there was a video tape or the interview between Mr. Hatch and 
Mr. Webb. 
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The Court: You know/ it would just help if you would just say 
there wasn't a tape of it. Is there a tape? 
Mr. Halls: There is a tape. There's a video tape of an interview 
with the victim. 
The Court: Okay. Is there a transcript of that video tape? 
Mr. Halls: No. 
The Court: Thank you. 
Mr. Halls: And I don't, and there is not a video tape of the other 
interview. It's basically these people's notes as given notes or 
understanding as given to Ms. Veach. 
The Court: Okay. (Tr. MTD p. 13-15) 
The State's response to the Defendant's discovery requests indicates 
that the Prosecution fully complied. There is nothing in the record which 
indicates that there was any material withheld from the defense. The 
Defendant quotes the case of State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993) 
for the proposition that the court not requiring that statements be recorded, 
"inferred" the importance of recording certain statements. In fact, the Court 
in that case indicated that some problems which occasionally arise with regard 
to statements could be averted if recorded. But there was and is no 
requirement that the investigating officers for the state record certain types 
of statements. Defendant then "bootstraps" from this case to a conclusion on 
page 23 of her brief where she states "at a minimum Defendant was entitled to 
a report in advance of trial by these two (2) CPS workers so that she could 
prepare to meet their testimony". Defendant would have been entitled to 
receive that material if there had been a transcript of such statement. Since 
a transcript did not exist, the Defendant is not entitled to receive from the 
prosecution, materials which do not exist. The Court found no discovery 
violation at all. (Tr. MTD p.21) 
In the case of State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661-662, the Court 
analyzed Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16, a statutory provision which has since 
been codified as Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This was a 
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case in which the defendant had formally requested discovery and the 
prosecution had made all of their materials available to the defendant by 
giving him the case file. The specifics of what one of the witnesses informed 
the prosecution he knew just prior to trial were not given to the defense. 
The Court in analyzing the statute covering discovery violation reviewed the 
first five points of the statute (now Rule 16) which states: 
"Except as otherwise provided the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: (1) relevant written or recorded 
statements of the defendant or co-defendants; . . . (4) evidence 
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the 
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and (5) any other 
item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. . ." (Emphasis 
added) 
The rule requires the prosecutor to disclose material and information of 
which he has knowledge. If certain information does not exist because it has 
not been produced in some form, it is not the obligation of the prosecutor's 
office to produce a transcript of a video tape because that is the medium the 
Defendant would like to view and work from. 
C. NOTIFYING THE DEFENDANT THAT SHE MAY OBTAIN A COPY OF THE VIDEO TAPE 
FOR A FEE DOES NOT VIOLATE DISCOVERY RULES OR THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The State answered Defendant's discovery request on October 15, 1999 in 
response to a telephone request for discovery made on October 12, 1999, by 
providing all of the prosecution's file material. (Transcript p. 187-188) 
At paragraph 4 of the State's Answer to Request for Discovery, the 
prosecutor notified the Defendant of video and audio interviews by stating: 
"There is a video and cassette tape of interviews of the victim. 
Copies can be reproduced for a fee. Please advise if you want 
copies made." 
Defendant asserts that such a statement violates the Utah Constitution 
at Article I, Section 12, by compelling the Defendant to advance money or fees 
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to secure the rights provided by Article 12. The Defendant asserts that such 
tapes may contain exculpatory information which could have been used as a tool 
to cross-examine the victim. (Defendant's Brief p.26) While these assertions 
may be true, nothing prevented the Defendant or her counsel from coming to the 
Prosecutor's office and viewing the tapes for that, or any other purpose. 
Rule 16 provides that it is the prosecutor's responsibility to 
"disclose" materials to the defendant. Further, Rule 16 (5)(e) states: 
"When convenience reasonably requires the prosecutor or defense 
may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material 
and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified 
reasonable times and places." 
Nothing requires the State to pay for these materials. Defendant was 
represented by counsel of her choosing. Defendant never made any motion or 
representation to the Court that she was indigent. Nothing in the discovery 
rules requires the prosecution stand the cost of providing discovery of 
photographs, video tapes or other materials to a defendant. If the Court is 
to take the assertion of the Defendant on this issue to its logical 
conclusion, the prosecution would be obligated to pay all of the Defendant's 
costs in pursuing her defense, which may include subpoenaing her own witnesses 
or even paying her attorney fees. The Court has certainly not indulged or 
conceded defendants this point. In the recent case of State v. Burns, 2000 WL 
868493 (Utah June 2000), a case in which a defendant was denied the help of an 
expert witness where the defendant was not using the legal defender's 
association (LDA) counsel. The Court, in analyzing under what circumstances a 
person could obtain the assistance of an expert, reviewed statutory authority 
which provides that cities, counties and other government entities must make 
provisions for the adequate defense of indigents under U.C.A. §77-32-1 (now 
codified at §77-32-301: 
"Nothing in Section 77-32-1 conditions expert assistance on the 
appointment of state-funded counsel . . . Furthermore, it is 
clear from the plain language of that section that a county must 
provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a 
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complete defense to every indigent person, not just to those 
represented by the LDA. . . . The only deciding factor of 
eligibility for this type of assistance are that the defendant in 
a criminal case be indigent and that the investigatory and other 
facilities be necessary to a complete defense/7 Id. at 6 
"Furthermore, Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that xupon showing that a defendant is financially unable 
to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for 
adequate defense the witness fee shall be paid as if he were 
called on behalf of the prosecution.' Quoting Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 15(a)[FN 5) There is no indication in this rule 
that a defendant must be represented by LDA to qualify for this 
assistance. Instead, the only prerequisite for eligibility are 
financial inability to pay and necessity for an adequate defense. 
It follows therefore that the only requirement for receiving 
public assistance for expert witnesses are proof of necessity and 
establishment of indigence/' Burns, Id. at 6. 
It is the State's contention that while the Burns case dealt with the 
provision of expert help, the same reasoning applies to the request by any 
defendant that the State fund the cost of copying video tapes. It is simply 
not the responsibility of the State to pay the costs of Defendant's defense 
except under the criteria as set forth in Burns, namely that the Defendant 
establish her indigence and secondly, that she establish that the materials 
sought were necessary for an adequate defense. The Defendant was represented 
by her own counsel and at no time ever made the assertion of being indigent. 
The State is not responsible for providing copies of video tapes at the 
State's expense. Notice to Defendant that material pertinent to the case is 
available does not "compel" any action on the part of the Defendant. It 
discloses the existence of material that the Defendant should then evaluate to 
determine its usefulness to their defense. 
IV 
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS 
A prosecutor's duty is to see that justice is done. This means that a 
prosecutor should be fair in his dealings, but there is nothing which says 
that a prosecutor cannot be zealous, committed or even aggressive in the 
pursuance of the prosecution of a case. A defendant is not entitled to a 
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"mellow or docile" prosecutor, but in any event the allegation of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness can be belied by this observation. The 
prosecutor in this case sought to include all incidents from November 28 
through December 6 into one count. Had the case gone through to a verdict and 
the defendant been convicted, she would only have one child abuse conviction 
on her record. It is the defense in this case that insisted that the 
prosecution could not proceed, to the point of requesting a mistrial. The 
defense insisted that the incidents were separate and that they hadn't had 
opportunity to prepare for both. A mistrial having been declared, the 
prosecutor is faced with a decision as to whether the matter should be filed 
as a single incident or as two. Is the prosecution required to ignore the 
assertions of Defendant that this is not one criminal episode and choose which 
count to prosecute or take the simpler approach of just separating the 
counts? 
The trial court, in referring to the issue of vindictiveness, after 
observing all of the proceedings stated: 
"And I don't see vindictiveness here . . . I don't, don't find 
that you've acted in bad faith . . . I don't think it's 
vindictive to file two charges. I actually heard evidence that 
might be tampering with evidence and the prosecutor hasn't filed 
that. So I don't see that there's an attitude of vindictiveness 
towards the defendant." (Tr. MTD 23) 
"The Court: Well, the girl testified that there was a tape that 
she was - - she had a tape where she was surreptitiously taping 
what Ms. Nebeker was doing and Ms. Nebeker says xYou're not gonna 
get that', pulled the stuff up . . . 
Mr. Halls: She also testified, at the same time, that the mother 
had made some comment to her about never bringing a charge or 
taking it to court . . . 
The Court: . . . Yeah. That's what I was thinking. That other 
might have been tampering with a witness. I'm not saying they're 
terrific cases. I'm just saying that if I had an over zealous 
prosecutor here, I'd expect to see those charges filed, at least." 
(Tr. MTD 24-25, Findings 7, Transcipt 229) 
Defendant refers to statements that additional allegations "may be 
looked into". In the preparation of the case several of the victim's family 
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members approached the prosecutor and indicated that they had been abused by 
the defendant while they lived with her. The prosecutor indicated they could 
provide the appropriate information and it would be determined if additional 
charges would be brought. It is a part of a prosecutor's duty, when informed 
of possible criminal activity, to invite the person to proceed to the point of 
determining whether a crime has been committed. A statement that the 
prosecutor will conduct his duty is no evidence that he acted maliciously or 
in bad faith or that there was any retaliatory motivation. It is actually an 
indication of exactly the opposite. The State has been unable to find any 
Utah cases on this issue; neither did the Defendant provide any Utah cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant failed to preserve her Due Process argument when she 
failed either at trial or in the Motion to Dismiss to raise a claim of Due 
Process as an issue. 
Double Jeopardy is not a bar to reprosecution because the Defendant 
moved the Court for the mistrial and hereby waived their claim to raise double 
jeopardy, even if the prosecution or court provoked the error. The Defendant 
has failed to show any bad faith on the part of the State or court to provoke 
a mistrial to provide a more favorable opportunity to convict. 
The Defendant was given all discovery prior to trial, which included 
notification that video and audio tapes existed. The Defendant's failure to 
object or request transcripts pursuant to Rule 12(b) precludes the issue being 
raised on appeal. However, there weren't any additional materials to be 
produced. There was no discovery violation. 
The State is not required to fund discovery of defendants except where 
the statutes require it, i.e., indigent defendants. This Defendant never 
claims indigency and had her own attorney. Notice of the availability of 
material does not "compel" Defendant to reproduce it. She could have view the 
material at the presecutor's office to determine its usefulness to her case. 
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The Defendant has made no case whatsoever for a claim of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. The Court found that the prosecutor made every effort to see 
the trial to its conclusion and that evidence at trial showed that a witness 
tampering charge was possible, but not brought. The filing of the Amended 
Information charging two separate counts is not vindictive. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's 
claim for relief and find against Defendant in each particular asserted by 
her. The matter should be remanded to the District Court for trial on the 
amended information. 
DATED this 6th day of September, 2000. 
CRAIG C. HALJ/Sj 
Attorney for(#ppellee 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Article I, Section 12 [Rights of accused persons.]: 
xxIn criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the country or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband , nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-403(4): 
"There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been 
empaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with 
the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding 
not attributable to the state that would make 
any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible 
as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it 
impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; 
or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3); 
"Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised 
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised 
at least five days prior to the trial: 
. . . (3) requests for discovery where allowed;. . . 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a): 
"Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to 
the defense upon request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or 
codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendants; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for 
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-32-301: 
"Each county, city and town shall provide for the defense of an 
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state in accordance with the 
following minimum standards: 
. . . (3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a 
complete defense; . . . 
